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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the electric utility industry during the energy crisis of 
the 1970’s and compares the various factors of the crisis and the operation of 
utilities during the crisis to current trends in solid waste management. Due to 
sim ilarities between the electric utilities and an integrated solid waste 
management system, and similarities between crisis factors, a statement can be 
made about the the cumulative effects of the energy crisis on the electric utility 
industry and the associated future impacts on solid waste management policies.
In conducting this analysis, we have concentrated on the following 
parameters:
1. Determine what functional relationship exists between electricity 
consumption and various factors brought about by the energy crisis, and build a 
causal forecasting model to support the conclusions.
2. Determine how increasing electric prices influenced a decrease in the 
growth rate of residential electricity consumption, and hypothesize a similar 
relationship between the cost of solid waste disposal and the growth rate of 
solid waste generation.
By investigating these questions, we were able to gain insight into the 
complexity of the relationships that occurred during the Energy Crisis, and how 
these same conditions exist today in the Solid Waste Crisis, giving policy 
implications about the future of solid waste management.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The normal mechanisms that work so well in providing consumers with 
the products they want, often do not provide adequate financial incentives to 
encourage stewardship in the disposal and recovery of used products. Local 
governments typically have, and are faced with increasing quantities of waste 
requiring disposal. While recycling, composting, and incineration are leading to 
larger quantities of waste diverted from landfills, population and economic 
growth have resulted in no net reduction in the 130,000,000 tons of garbage we 
send to landfills in the United States each year (1).
In many states, there is very little landfill capacity remaining. Even in 
Colorado, experts estimate that there are only between 5 and 10 years of 
landfill capacity remaining in the state (2). Also, new EPA regulations have 
reduced the number of landfills that meet specifications for use, without 
considerable upgrading costs. We simply must find new ways to reduce the 
amount of trash we produce, and manage its disposal better.
In an article entitled “How Can Communities Judge the True Cost of 
Solid Waste Management?,” Solid Waste & Power. October 1989, Mr. E. Larry 
Beaumont proposes that solid waste should be managed in a manner similar to 
public service agencies, specifically with electric utilities. He poses the 
following problem (3):
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Many providers of solid waste management do not think of 
themselves as public service agencies, since they provide 
fragmented, disconnected pieces of the total system. What 
happens when a new law suddenly requires closure of the 
landfill? Or what if a municipality is required to implement 
recycling? The effect on these fragmented “agencies” can be 
devastating, with interruptions in service, angry ratepayers, and an 
uncertain, reactive future.
Mr. Beaumont saw that drawing of parallels between solid waste 
management and electric utilities could result in management models for solid 
waste “utilities.” He further saw, as a result of extensive experience with the 
solid waste problem on the Eastern Seaboard, that the current solid waste crisis 
might have parallels with the “energy crisis” of the 1970’s. He believed that the 
lessons necessary to solve the solid waste crisis, may have already been 
demonstrated in a similar crisis, and all that was remaining to be done was an 
analysis of the one, relating it to the other.
As a result, R. W. Beck and Associates asked me to conduct this study, an 
analysis of the effects of the “energy crisis” on residential energy consumption, 
and its parallel crisis: solid waste management. This study has been made 
using methods of operations research, including an economic and statistical 
analysis.
Chapter 2 discusses in detail the methodology that I have used in 
conducting this analysis. However, to provide some focus from the outset, I will 
briefly describe what I have done here. In conducting this analysis, we are 
concerned about common factors that affect energy consumption and solid
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waste generation, for example, cost of services, gross national product (GNP), 
and some measure of population. Using the forecasting techniques described 
in the following chapter, I have used models that will suggest how elastic these 
factors are over a long period. In this case we have used the period from 1960 
to 1988, since it incorporates the period of crisis years, 1973-75, 1980-83, and 
1985-86.
The models used in this analysis are not intended to provide an accurate 
forecast of consumption in the future. Instead, they will provide answers to 
questions about the elasticities of the various factors affecting consumption in 
the past, and which correspondingly, may affect solid waste generation in the 
future. We are interested in discovering how these factors affected consumption 
during the entire period from 1960 to 1988, collectively, in the presence of 
recurring crisis conditions. This need has dictated the models that I have used.
There appears to be no previous work related to this thesis topic. 
Specifically, there has not been an attempt to compare energy and solid waste, 
or to use the results of an analysis of the energy crisis on energy consumption 
to say something about the effects of the solid waste crisis on solid waste 
disposal. However, the volumes of work regarding the energy crisis itself, could 
hardly be contained in an average college library. Therefore, in analyzing the 
“energy crisis” and energy consumption, I have been able to recover a large 
amount of previous work to assist me. However, in drawing parallels to solid 
waste management, I have depended on the expertise of R. W. Beck and 
Associates.
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It is somewhat misleading in talking about the amount of work available 
for reference on energy consumption and the energy crisis. More than 90% of 
this published work was researched from 1970 to 1980. Very little information is 
available regarding forecasting models used before 1970, and very little has 
been published since 1980 (although much work is still carried out by private 
consulting firms). Even less has been published since 1980, analyzing the 
“energy crisis” (which may still be in progress), and much of the material may be 
outdated.
It would seem that I have the good fortune to analyze this problem with 
the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Thus, I would contend that this study is more a 
historical study of the past, yielding lessons learned for the future, rather than a 
forecasting tool for things yet to come. Therefore, my magnificent contribution is 
a statement, supported with historical facts, and analyzed with tools of 
operations research, maintaining that we do not need to go through another 
“crisis” to learn how to fix our current problems. This study will show the need 
for fresh thinking in “environmental economics.” Traditional approaches to 
supply and demand may need radical change if we are to solve the solid waste 
and other impending environmental crises.
Before I present an annotated bibliography of the background research, I 
think it is necessary to understand that a direct analysis of the solid waste crisis 
and solid waste disposal is not feasible at this time. Due to the deficiencies 
inherent in most solid waste management systems today, the type of data
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needed to do a direct analysis is inadequate. For example, there is at least one 
major problem with current measurements of solid waste economics: disposal 
fees are often artificially low, not covering all long-term costs. Therefore, the 
data, if not true, is somewhat misleading. An integrated system, as proposed by 
Mr. Beaumont and the professionals in the field, would begin to overcome these 
problems by generating accurate cost data (See Reference 3 for details of an 
integrated system). Currently, however, the true data required is not available, 
nor is there a system in place for obtaining this data. Therefore, any forecast 
made in this thesis, regarding solid waste, is purely hypothetical and based 
solely on parallel electric consumption forecasts. Further, due to the 
similarities, which are addressed in this thesis, we will be able to say something 
about the factors affecting solid waste disposal, using the elasticities obtained in 
the study for energy consumption. We do have data on the total amount and 
type of solid waste disposed of in the United States, from 1960 to 1986, that will 
allow us to compare solid waste generation to energy consumption.
Keeping in mind the comparative nature of this problem, the following 
annotated bibliography contains references that seemed to be most pertinent to 
the problem that is posed in Chapter 2.
1. U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Facing America’s Trash: 
What Next for Municipal Solid Waste. OTA-O-424 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, October 1989).
A study on municipal solid waste (MSW), requested by the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology, and the Senate Committee on
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Environment and Public Works, in anticipation of the reauthorization of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The report discusses the 
options for a national policy based on the dual strategies of MSW 
prevention and better management. It also presents options to address 
immediate problems such as increased interstate shipments of MSW and 
unfinished Federal guidelines for landfills and incinerators.
2. E. Larry Beaumont. “How Can Communities Judge the True Cost of Solid
Waste Management?”, Solid Waste & Power. Vol.3/No.5, 5 October 
1989, 26-33.
This article discusses how the current system of municipal solid waste 
management hides many of its costs from the public, making it difficult to 
compare new options. The author suggests accounting for solid waste 
operations using utility-like methods. He maintains that, in this way, 
options can be compared on true overall costs. This article also 
introduces public service agency parallels.
3. State of Colorado. Interim Report of the Governors Task Force, on Integrated
Solid Waste Management. January 1990.
In August 1989, Governor Romer created the Integrated Solid Waste 
Management Task Force to study the existing status of solid waste 
management in Colorado and develop recommendations leading to a 
comprehensive plan for the state. This interim report summarizes the 
status of the issues and presents some short-term recommendations.
4. Melinda Beck, et al. “Buried Alive,” Newsweek. 27 November 1989, 66-76.
This article discusses the crisis of running out of space to put our trash. It 
includes some national and regional statistics, and discusses the various 
sources and recycling of MSW.
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5. Reid Lifset and Marian Chertow. “Pay-As-You-Throw Is the Solution To the
Waste Management Crisis,” Governing. May 1990, 74.
This article discusses the historically low fees for trash collection, and 
using the city of Seattle as an example, presents a case for charging for 
solid waste pickup according to the number of standardized cans a 
household uses. The author maintains that pay-as-you-throw, deposit 
laws, disposal bans and packaging taxes are all good ways to undo the 
free ride consumers and manufacturers have enjoyed at the expense of 
local government.
6. U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Residential Energy
Conservation. Vol 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
August 1979).
This study focuses on the demand aspect of residential energy use, 
specifically those functions that consume most of a home energy budget. 
It leads to the conclusion that the analysis of data on price and 
consumption, combined with research on consumer motivation, indicates 
a desire to save money is the principal motivation for changes in energy 
habits and investment in conservation.
7. Eric Hirst and Janet Carney. “The ORNL Engineering-Economic Model of
Residential Energy Use: Structure and Results,” Symposium Papers: 
Energy Modeling and Net Energy Analysis. Institute of Gas Technology, 
1978.
This paper presents the ORNL residential energy use model that was 
developed to simulate energy use in the residential sector from 1970 
through 2000. The model provides considerable detail on annual energy 
uses by fuel, end use, and housing type. It estimates annual equipment 
installations and ownership, equipment energy requirements, structure 
thermal performance, fuel expenditures, equipment costs, and costs for
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improving thermal performance of new and existing housing units. Thus 
the model provides considerable detail on residential energy use and 
associated costs.
8. W. G. Michaelson. “A Utility’s Forecasting Model: The Ideal and the Real,” 
Energy: Mathematics and Models (Philadelphia, PA. Society for Industrial 
and Applied Mathematics, 1976).
This paper discusses the uncertainty associated with forecasting energy 
demand, and maintains that today’s forecasts must have certain essential 
qualities evident to the decision maker: (a) They must be rational and 
responsible, (b) They must not be highly dependent on the expectation of 
deviant behavior of some exogenous variable, (c) They must be able to 
be made in a reason reasonably short period of time, (d) They must be 
explainable and believable to a non-forecaster, (e) They must reflect the 
beliefs and convictions of the forecaster, (f) They must be susceptible to 
checking and analysis when actual results are available. Each of these 
six qualities is further elaborated.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PROBLEM AND TECHNIQUES 
FOR SOLVING IT
R. W. Beck and Associates asked me to analyze the “energy crisis” of the 
1970’s and its effects on the electric utility industry, and to determine if 
relationships between increased consumer rates and other factors caused the 
American public to reduce its rate of consumption of energy, and if so, to draw a 
parallel scenario for the “solid waste crisis” of the 1990’s.
Research conducted in the Eastern United States, by Mr. Beaumont, 
presents some inherent problems associated with current solid waste 
management practices that allow us to draw parallel conclusions about solid 
waste from an analysis of the “energy crisis” and the pre-crisis electric utility 
industry. Two of the major problems within current solid waste management 
are (5):
1. First, disposal fees are often artificially low, not covering all long-term 
costs (which is true of electricity rates before the 1970’s). For example, 
collection costs are often quietly added to property tax, so the public never sees 
a separate disposal bill.
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2. Second, solid waste management alternatives are often considered 
competitors with the existing system and with other alternatives, rather than a 
blend of management options.
As a result, according to Mr. Beaumont, “communities compare new 
technologies and environm entally sound practices against current, 
inadequately funded systems. Either the community does nothing to improve 
current practices, or, if improvements are recommended, the public is outraged 
by what they see as dramatically higher disposal fees (6).”
Because of these problems, it is necessary for changes to be made in 
the current system. For example, adopting integrated solid waste management 
techniques could bring solid waste management in line with other currently 
existing public service systems, such as electrical utility management. These 
techniques include:
1. Adopt an integrated solid waste management system.
2. Consolidate ownership of the solid waste management system to a 
single entity, either public or private. Free enterprise can be protected through 
franchising, especially for curbside services. In fact, competition is essential in 
this area.
3. Establish a clear hierarchy of solid waste management tools to be 
implemented.
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4. Establish blended, rates based on variations in type of customer, level 
of use, and type of waste management behavior to be encouraged.
5. Establish equitable cost allocation through State Utilities Commission 
regulation.
6. Establish a financing structure allowing economically stable 
implementation of policy-directed alternatives based on total system cost, not 
stand-alone cost of a single element or potentially competing alternative.
An integrated solid waste management system incorporates every aspect 
of the solid waste system, including land-filling, composting, incineration, and 
recycling, and manages waste removal (i.e., curb-side pickup), transport, and 
disposal. This assures that all alternatives are considered in making the system 
economical, efficient, and environmentally sound.
Mr. Beaumont proposed Table 2-1, which compares the elements of a 
typical electric utility with the parallel needs of an integrated solid waste 
management agency.
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TABLE 2-1
Parallels Between an Electric Utility and a Solid Waste Agency




Service Area Control of Electricity Supply Waste Stream Control












Residuals Ash; Air Emissions; 
Wastewater
Ash; Air Emissions; 
Wastewater
Financing Revenue Bonds - System Revenue Bonds - System*




Revenues Blended Rates Blended Rates*
Energy; Recycled Products
Rate-payer Classes Multiple - Based on Use Multiple - Based on Use*






Regulatory Agencies State Utilities Commission 
State Environmental Permits
State Utilities Commission* 
State Environmental Permits*
*Kev elements requiring further development for truly integrated activities.
E. Larry Beaumont, “How Can Communities Judge the True Cost of Solid Waste 
Management?”, Solid Waste & Power. October 1989: 30.
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Table 2-1 suggests that, to achieve integrated public service agency 
status, and thus allow the parallel analysis to electrical utilities, a solid waste 
management agency has the following needs, and to do this analysis, it is 
necessary to assume that the following can be implemented (7):
1. Consolidation of ownership to a single entity, either public or private. 
Free enterprise can be protected through franchising, especially for curbside 
collection services.
2. Control of and responsibility for the entire waste stream.
3. Clear policy direction on the hierarchy of solid waste management 
tools to be implemented.
4. Blended rates, based on variations in type of customer, level of use, 
and type of waste management behavior to be encouraged.
5. Equitable cost allocation through State Utilities Commission 
regulation.
6. Financing structure allowing economically stable implementation of 
policy-directed alternatives based on total system cost, not stand-alone cost of a 
single element or potentially competing alternative.
These measures would begin to overcome current inadequacies of solid 
waste management, as similar measures rehabilitated a similarly troubled 
electric utility industry.
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Until recently, it appears that solid waste management costs have been 
of little concern to the public, even though collection costs receive immediate 
concern when brought to public attention. However, quantities of waste being 
landfilled are now approaching the level of crisis that brought energy to the 
public forefront. Again, what new, creative implications can be uncovered to 
provide incentives for reducing the generation of garbage?
In conducting this analysis, I propose to use the following operations 
research solution method:
1. Use econometric and forecasting techniques to develop a model for 
forecasting electricity consumption before 1970, and to analyze the economic 
factors effecting energy consumption during the energy crisis, using previously 
developed models.
2. Use explanatory or quantitative (causal) methods of forecasting, 
specifically statistical regression analysis, to determine if there is a relationship 
between electrical energy rates (per kwh), or other factors, and electrical energy 
consumption (per kwh).
3. Given that relationships exist, use explanatory or causal methods of 
forecasting and applied statistical methods to understand how these factors 
influenced reduced consumption, and to examine any economic trends that 
occurred during the energy crisis of the 1970’s that are related to this.
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4. Use economic analysis and forecasting to draw a parallel conclusion 
for municipal solid waste removal rates and solid waste production, for the 
“solid waste crisis” of the 1990’s. Introduce the concept that widespread 
implementation of solid waste “utilities” could lead to reduced amounts of 
municipal solid waste generated, as parallel economic factors, programs and 
incentives reduced energy consumption.
The first task of forecasting is to find the cause and effect relationship by 
observing the output of the system (either through time or by studying a cross 
section of similar systems) and relating that to the corresponding inputs.
Quantitative forecasting can be applied when three conditions exist:
1. Information about the past is available.
2. This information can be quantified in the form of numerical data.
3. It can be assumed that some aspects of the past pattern will continue 
into the future.
In this study, these conditions exist. There are some very reliable 
forecasting models that were formulated during the period from 1971 to 1980, 
that capture these relationships, and provide good forecasts, given the 
consumption levels of 1981 through 1988. However, models before 1970 are 
difficult to find in literature, and were inefficient in any case (8).
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Lester B. Lave, in a Resources for the Future Research Paper, says the
following concerning early forecasting models (9):
Before 1970, the models were rudimentary. While some of the 
supply models were sophisticated, demand models were 
universally crude... Energy models formerly consisted of either a 
direct link between energy and GNP or a partial equilibrium model 
with demand a function of energy price, income, and price of 
substitutes. The implication of these models are predictable: 
energy use will continue to increase as rapidly in the future as it 
did in the past and will be affected little by price increases.
As a result, I will formulate a model that reflects the mind-set of both 
forecasters and public service utilities of that era, to demonstrate the error in 
underestimating the impact of the cost of services on consumption in general, 
and on energy in particular, remembering all this time what has been said about 
the artificially low prices of solid waste disposal services.
Also, I will use the current econometric methodology to construct a more 
accurate model, to demonstrate the role of the cost of services in reducing the 
rate of consumption of energy. Since we want to know how much a given 
independent variable, such as cost per kilowatt hour, effects consumption, we 
want to examine elasticities. So, we will use a model reflecting the natural 
logarithms of both the dependent and independent variables, the log-log model. 
This will give us the elasticities of each variable as the coefficients of the 
variables in the model.
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
This analysis is concerned with electrical energy consumption, and what 
causes variations in energy consumption. The questions that we want to 
answer in this this regard, dictate the models that we will use. The combination 
of our data analysis and economic analysis, as well as an understanding of the 
historical development of the public utilities, would indicate that we have a need 
to examine two different regression models, as noted in Chapter 2, covering two 
different periods, and involving different mind-sets: 1960-1970, before the 
industry increased rates or experienced the full impact of crisis (historically, 
models for this period were inadequate); and 1960-1988, after the rates 
increased, and the adjustment to the financial, political, societal, and 
environmental aspects of the energy crisis were realized and caused the 
industry to reevaluate the management methodologies. Including the years 
from 1960 to 1970 in the second model will give us a model that accounts for 
the impact of energy crisis years.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I will discuss the "energy 
crisis" in general terms, and its overall economic effect. Also, I will compare it 
with the current “solid waste crisis”. Next, I will present an economic analysis of 
the decline of the electric utility industry and the changes in electricity
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consumption that corresponded to these changes. This decline refers to 
problems encountered by the electric utilities after its early success as an 
industry. Finally, I will present an econometric regression analysis, applying the 
tools of quantitative (causal) forecasting, to support the conclusions of the 
economic analysis.
3.1. The Energy Crisis.
In October 1973, the Arabic world placed an embargo on crude oil to 
pressure the West into turning support from Israel, and instead lend support to 
the suppliers of the precious commodity, oil.
Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson M.P., Secretary of State for Energy of the United 
Kingdom, remarked in retrospect: "Initially the great oil crisis of 1973 was 
perceived as a problem of an actual physical shortage of energy... pretty soon it 
was clear that the real problem was something else altogether, namely the 
quadrupling of the price of oil virtually overnight and this certainly was serious 
business, presenting the world economy with an appalling adjustment problem 
(10)."
According to G. Tyler Miller, Jr., Professor of Human Ecology and 
Coordinator of Environmental Studies at St. Andrews Presbyterian College, five 
main factors led to the energy crisis (11):
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1. Our total and our per capita energy consumption had been continually 
rising rapidly.
2. The demand for oil and natural gas had outstripped the domestic 
supply and refining capacity, producing an increased dependence on imports.
3. Because all energy use pollutes to some degree, the increased use of 
energy had come into direct conflict with our need to preserve the air, water, 
and land.
4. The lack of a coordinated national energy policy had led to poor long 
range planning and to conflicting policies on the part of government and the 
energy industries.
5. Potentially useful energy options such as solar, geothermal, nuclear 
fusion, wind power, and energy conservation had not been developed.
In 1979, some experts posed an Integrated Energy Plan for the United 
States as a solution to the crisis. Its scope was long term, incorporating three 
phases: Short Term (present to 1985), Intermediate (1985 to 2000), and Long 
Term (2000 to 2020). Some of the elements of the first phase included (with 
milestone dates omitted): establishment of a National Energy Agency at cabinet 
level, development of national policy, establishment of a national data bank on 
all energy resources and use patterns, institution of thermodynamic 
bookkeeping for all energy resources and options, declaration of an energy 
education year to inform the American public of the nature of the crisis,
T -  4051 20
reduction of growth rate of energy consumption, breaking up the vertical and 
horizontal monopolistic structure of energy companies, implementation of an 
energy conservation program, institution of higher rates for large electricity and 
natural gas users, provide economic incentives for recycling industries, and 
greatly increase recycling of paper, aluminum, and steel (60% by 1985) (12).
Two measures that are often overlooked in the integrated energy plan, 
were the requirement for all new cars to achieve an average of 20 miles per 
gallon, or be taxed proportionally, and the enactment of legislation requiring all 
new appliances to meet higher efficiency standards. These were important 
factors in the reduction of the growth rate of consumption, although more difficult 
to measure than cost of energy in a statistical analysis. Note that recycling was 
a factor during the energy crisis, as well as the solid-waste crisis.
A further factor that is difficult to measure quantitatively is the reaction of 
the American consumer to the panic incited by the crisis, and to their 
conservation efforts due to education about energy consumption and mass 
media attention of the crisis. This factor, along with the previous two factors, will 
be accounted for in our subsequent model using a dummy variable.
If a comparison is made of the factors that caused the “energy crisis” to 
those that are affecting the “solid waste crisis”, we can easily see similarities 
(See Table 3-1 on next page). For the purpose of analysis, we will talk about 
the two crises as if they were the same, due to these similarities.
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TABLE 3-1
Comparison of Solid Waste and Energy Crises
Energy Crisis
(1) Our total and our per capita energy 
consumption had been continually rising 
rapidly.
(2) The demand for oil and natural gas had 
outstripped the domestic supply and refining 
capacity, producing an increased dependence 
on imports.
(3) Because all energy use pollutes to some 
degree, the increased use of energy had 
come into direct conflict with our need to 
preserve the air, water, and land.
(4) The lack of a coordinated national energy 
policy had led to poor long range planning and 
to conflicting policies on the part of 
government and the energy industries.
(5) Potentially useful energy options such as 
solar, geothermal, nuclear fusion, wind power, 
and energy conservation had not been 
developed.
Solid Waste Crisis
(1) Our total per capita of solid waste 
tonnage is continually increasing.
(2) The demand for disposal sites, i.e., 
landfills, has outstripped the domestic capacity 
in many cities and is beginning to outstrip 
capacity in others.
(3) Because of health hazards, eyesores, 
and pollution, solid waste disposal is coming 
into direct conflict with our need to preserve 
the air, water, and land.
(4) The lack of coordinated state and 
municipal policy has led to poor long range 
planning and conflicting policies.
(5) Alternate disposal methods such as 
recycling and incineration, are not being fully 
utilized.
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According to economic theory, if we examine the concept of 
consumption, we will see that the more we consume, the more we will have to 
dispose of. Our consumption habits generally follow the same patterns, 
whether they be the consumption of gas, electricity, food, etc. Solid waste is 
subjected to many of the discriminators that typically constrain other 
consumption issues: more stringent governmental (EPA) standards, increased 
public awareness through education and mass media, perhaps increased cost 
of services, and ultimately, reduced available space to put it.
Energy, too, suffered these things: stringent governmental standards, 
increased public awareness through education and mass media, increased 
cost of services, and ultimately, no more energy to consume. The energy crisis 
was like a splash of cold water in the face on Monday morning; it caused us to 
wake up from our dreamlike life-style, and to face reality again.
However, according to Leonard S. Hyman, the electric utilities were not 
influenced by the energy crisis alone. In fact, we shall see that there were 
several events and factors that contributed to the decline of the industry as early 
as 1965. The energy crisis only added more pressure to an already 
troublesome situation for the utilities (13).
To properly analyze the events and effects that these events had on 
energy consumption during the “energy crisis”, one must first be familiar with the 
organization, operation and financial structure of the electric utilities. It is not 
readily apparent that cost of service, alone, is not the primary factor in the
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reduction of the rate of consumption, in the decade of the crisis. An 
understanding of the financial infrastructure, in general, is necessary. The next 
section analyzes impact of crisis on this infrastructure in detail.
3.2. The Decline of the Electric Utilities.
Leading up to the energy crisis the electric utilities faced four major 
events shook the foundations of the industry (14).
1. The Northeast Blackout of 1965 — On November 2, 1965, a broken 
backup relay on the Ontario Hydro system set loose a series of power 
disconnections and surges (15). It took twelve minutes from the time the 
operational interruption knocked out the relay in a little box at the Sir Adam 
Beck facility to produce the worst power failure in the age of electricity, engulfing 
30 million people over an area 80,000 square miles in one form or another of 
dark reality.
After that event, the Federal Power Commission launched an 
investigation and instituted new reporting procedures to keep track of power 
outages. Further investigation showed that minor outages had not been 
uncommon in the past, and that in the years that followed the blackout, there 
were several noteworthy power failures. The Northeast blackout shook 
management and regulators out of their complacency, an attitude caused by 
years of fairly smooth operations.
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2. The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74 — In the wake of the Yom Kippur 
War, Middle Eastern oil producers cut off shipments to the United States and the 
OPEC nations multiplied the price for oil several-fold (16). In response to that 
action, Americans reduced their consumption of electricity to a previously 
unimaginable degree. As the price for fuel rose and was passed on to many 
customers by means of the fuel adjustment clause, price became a determinant 
in dampening the demand for electricity. In 1974, sales of electricity dropped 
from the year-earlier level. That was the first time since 1946 that a year-to-year 
decline occurred. Furthermore, the pattern of steady, rapid growth ceased. The 
industry had geared its capital spending and expense budget to automatic 
sales gains. When those gains did not materialize, the industry faced two 
severe problems. First, it was caught in a squeeze between high fixed costs 
and declining base rate revenues that resulted from a drop in sales. Second, 
the industry was uncertain about what to do with a capital spending program 
that was based on rapid growth in demand. For a while, utility management 
and regulators viewed the slowdown in demand as an aberration. To the last, 
management and regulators felt that the American public would ultimately 
continue to demand power at the same growth rate as before. As a result, 
management made commitments to build, and those commitments proved to be 
not only erroneous but also a financial burden in succeeding years. Finally, 
many utilities had inadequate fuel adjustment clauses, and the rapid increase in 
fuel costs squeezed margins. The industry reeled from the financial 
consequences of increased costs and reduced sales. More important, however,
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was that the era of rapid growth in sales had ended, but the industry’s reaction 
was delayed.
3. Consolidated Edison Omits its Common Stock Dividend in April 1974 
— Consolidated Edison ran into a financial bind that culminated in the sale of 
some of its facilities to an agency of the State of New York and the omission of 
its dividend. Con Edison’s dividend omission hit the industry with the impact of 
a sledge hammer. It smashed the keystone of faith for investment in utilities: 
that the dividend was safe and would be paid. Wall Street firms, at the behest of 
panic-stricken clients, prepared lists that showed which utilities were in bad 
shape. In April 1974, the price for the average utility stock fell by 18%. By 
September, prices for utility stocks had fallen by 36%. Utility stocks declined 
well below book value, making future financing dictionary. Partly because of 
financial pressures, capital expenditures declined in 1975 for the first time since 
1962. It was a new era, but unfortunately some did not (or were unwilling to) 
adapt to the changes (17, 18).
4. The Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island on March 28, 1979 — On 
that day, a cooling system malfunction started the country’s first major, well 
publicized civilian nuclear accident (19). For days, reports of core meltdown, 
escape of radiation and potential explosion frightened the population of the 
Northeast. The nuclear reactor finally went out of service after having incurred 
several hundred million dollars worth of damage. The Three Mile Island 
accident destroyed the complacency about nuclear power. Anti-nuclear 
demonstrations attracted thousands (similar demonstrations are occurring in
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Europe, particularly in West Germany, today). Many investors made it clear that 
they did not want to own securities in nuclear-oriented utilities, probably less 
because of fear of the health and safety hazards of nuclear power, than 
because of the financial hazards.
In 1945-65, America’s energy consumption moved in line with its 
economic activity, (for example, with GNP) and demand for electricity grew at 
roughly twice the rate of the economy (20). This might be contributed to the fast 
pace of the development of electrical appliances, to the discovery of the 
convenience and cleanliness of electricity, and to smart marketing by electric 
utilities. These factors helped to create demand, which in turn allowed utilities 
to reach for greater economies of scale and operation, which in turn sufficiently 
lowered the price of power to encourage the development and marketing of 
new electrical devices. Whether the development of new markets occurred 
because of the drop in the price for electricity, or vice versa, is left to debate. 
The reality is that price for electricity declined not only on an absolute basis but 
also in relation to prices as a whole. And, electricity usage grew far faster than 
energy usage as a whole.
In 1965-70, the trend toward increased use of electricity continued. The 
price for electricity remained flat despite a sharp upturn both in the overall cost 
of living and in the price for oil and coal. Other energy sources, such as fuel oil 
and natural gas, showed greater increases in price (21). In part, the continuing 
push toward electricity occurred because electricity prices declined in relation to 
other prices. In part, according to Hyman, it occurred because of fears that
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supply of natural gas was inadequate, and because increasing environmental 
awareness caused some users of energy to push their environmental problems 
onto the electric utility by switching to central station power (22).
In a way, the inability (or unwillingness) of the electric utility industry to 
raise prices when costs of operation and capital began to rise (possibly 
because neither utility management nor regulators realized that a fundamental 
change in costs was taking place) triggered the deterioration of the industry. 
Moreover the process of deterioration was accelerated because the 
uneconomically low price for power induced increased demand, which became 
increasingly difficult to meet profitably at then current rates. Cost of production 
had started to rise, but electricity was priced as if costs were still declining.
From 1970 on, the industry began to raise prices. Although the price for 
electricity did not rise as much as that for competing fuels, it increased more 
than prices as a whole throughout the economy (23, 24). Hyman shows that, in 
that period, energy consumption grew at a slower rate than GNP as a whole, 
while use of electricity continued to to grow faster than GNP, although the 
relative rate of growth between electricity and GNP was less than in any other 
postwar periods (25).
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TABLE 3-2  (26, 27)
Electricity and Other Energy Index 1945 -  1981 (1945 equals 100)



















1945 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1950 108 99 143 105 105 146 155 134
1955 133 122 232 97 118 174 153 149
1960 142 137 311 98 136 180 178 164
1965 171 173 427 92 141 192 174 175
1970 215 200 605 92 145 223 278 215
1975 228 222 738 156 293 470 715 299
1980 245 269 880 252 715 1206 866 457
1985 237 319 950 356 789 1659 1012 597
Relative Rates of Growth
Period Electricity to Electricity to









As can be seen from the table above, the utility industry after 1965 
supplied an increasing percentage of the electricity generated in the United 
States. Industrial generators produced a decreasing percentage of the total, 
despite the rising cost of central station power. Two possible reasons were that 
utility power did not reflect the true cost of production and therefore was a 
bargain, and that industrial producers were not interested in becoming 
regulated utilities or dealing with the environmental roadblocks to the
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production of electricity. In addition, the investor owned utilities continued to 
gain market share.
Nineteen sixty-five was a watershed year for the electric utility industry. 
In that year, electric utility stock prices peaked, rate reductions were at their 
greatest levels, debt service coverage ratios reached a height not seen since, 
the Vietnam War began in earnest, and the Northeast Blackout showed that all
was not well in the electric utility industry (28).
Capital spending soon became a problem. In November 1965, an 
equipment failure at Ontario Hydro caused the collapse of the interconnected 
power pools throughout the Northeast, plunging that region into darkness. The 
Northeast Blackout forced soul-searching within the industry. Perhaps the 
individual electric companies had insufficient generating capacity in reserve to 
meet emergencies. Reserve margins had been falling for several years. 
Perhaps the system of high voltage interconnections between utilities or regions 
was inadequate to meet emergencies. Although money had to be spent to
improve reliability of service, doing so meant an investment that would not
necessarily lower costs nor be automatically associated with increased 
revenues — as would have been the case if the money were being spent to 
meet new demand for service (29, 30).
Capital expenditures rose for other reasons as well. As the 
environmental movement gained popularity, partly due to the Clean Air Act of 
1970, utilities beautified plants, converted generating units to less polluting
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fuels, and put on line equipment that brought them into compliance with new 
environmental regulations. None of these moves, however, made plants more 
efficient or helped the utilities to meet the needs of new customers. 
Furthermore, environmental opposition to utility activities caused delays and 
revisions in construction programs, thereby adding to costs (31). Those who 
ran the companies probably found it difficult to understand and to adjust to the 
new constraints, with the result that conflicts were frequent. Many in the industry 
saw the situation in superficial terms. They thought that meeting environmental 
demands meant beautifying substations, putting power lines underground, and 
designing esthetic, sky blue towers to carry the transmission lines.
Furthermore, not only did the cost of electric plants rise because of 
inflation, but also because the industry was building a more expensive kind of 
power plant. The difficulty in securing gas supplies, discouraged utilities from 
building low cost gas burning plants. Instead, they turned to fuels that required 
more elaborate generating units. Environmental protection devices added to 
the cost of equipment. Construction delays and labor productivity problems 
surfaced during the overheated Vietnam War economy. In addition, the industry 
had plunged into the nuclear age, and nuclear generating plants cost more to 
build per kilowatt of capacity, although the higher capital costs were supposed 
to be offset by lower fuel costs. The industry, however, was dealing with an 
unfamiliar technology, and one that was feared and opposed by a vocal 
segment of the population. As a result of technological and political roadblocks, 
nuclear generating units took longer to build and were more costly than
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expected, and in many instances proved to be disappointing performers (32).
Consequently, capital spending accelerated, the rate base rose 
considerably faster than sales, and a large percentage of the needed funds had 
to be raised by selling new capital. Unfortunately, the sale of securities 
occurred as interest rates were rising. Paying out increasingly high interest 
rates on an increasing amount of debt when income was not rising 
proportionately caused the decline of the pretax interest coverage ratio. That 
meant that the industry’s debt was declining in quality, and that, in turn, required 
payment of even higher interest rates. In short, not only were interest rates as a 
whole on a secular uptrend, but interest costs of utilities rose even more 
because utility bonds were becoming increasingly risky (33).
The way to stop the squeeze on margins was to raise the price for 
electricity or to reduce costs. The industry’s costs previously had fallen 
sufficiently fast to maintain profitability levels even after reducing (or only 
minimally raising) the price for power (34). However, productivity was on a 
downtrend and could not be relied on as in the past. Neither regulators nor 
management seems to have caught the trend, and critics of the industry showed 
as little prescience.
Positive rate relief did not materialize for several years. In the interim, 
both the pretax interest coverage for debt and the return on stockholder 
investment dropped. Subsequent rate relief was sufficient to raise the ratios to 
previous levels. Because bond ratings also fell, the utilities had to pay higher
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interest charges than they would have otherwise, and during crisis periods in 
the bond markets, some of the poorly rated utilities had difficulty raising money 
at all (35).
The common stockholder, the owner of the business, also fared poorly. 
Return on equity investment tapered off. In reality, the drop in return was greater 
than the numbers indicated because an increasing proportion of that declining 
return was derived from a non-cash credit in the income statement — the 
allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC), also known as interest 
during construction (IDC) (36). To make matters worse, numerous companies 
adopted increasingly liberal accounting procedures in other respects to 
maintain a pattern of gains in reported earnings. One could argue, therefore, 
that the overall quality of reported earnings also had fallen and that the decline 
in return on stockholders’ equity was much greater than was apparent from the 
bare numbers.
According to Hyman, the common stockholders faced two problems, 
sensitivity of the stock price to the movement of interest rates, and the inability of 
the companies to raise return earned while the return on competitive 
investments rose. If we consider the market situation after 1965, the return on 
bonds continued to rise, but the return earned on the stockholders’ investment 
in the electric utility continued to fall. Investors sold the stocks, thereby causing 
prices to decline until the return on stocks was commensurate with returns 
offered elsewhere (37).
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The result of that combination of lower return on stockholders’ equity and 
higher interest rates was to cause stock prices to drop until they were well 
below book values. Utility companies had to raise money by selling common 
stock below book value (true of almost all electric companies by the mid 
1970’s), thereby diluting the interests of their shareholders, and those 
companies probably invested the funds for a return unfairly low according to 
regulatory theory. Investors were discouraged by the level of profitability in the 
industry. Electric utility shares declined on an absolute basis (halving between 
1965 and 1975), did worse than the average industrial share, and fell to prices 
at which new financing was dilutionary and probably damaging to existing 
shareholders (38).
The industry ran into problems on all fronts when, after 1965, it continued 
to do what had served so well before: it added increasingly large generating 
plants. Heat rate did not improve, however, and the cost of incremental 
generating capacity rose faster than either the cost of living or the utility 
construction index. New plants were more expensive but not more efficient than 
old plants. The apparent drop in cost of new facilities after 1978 is due to the 
inability to put nuclear power plants into service for a while after the Three Mile 
Island accident. Power plants scheduled through the mid 1980's had costs per 
kilowatt several times that shown in 1980 and 1981. Fuel prices rose sharply, 
especially after the 1973-74 oil embargo. David Hawdon shows that the 
inability to utilize the fuel efficiency, or to offset the effect of the dwindling 
importance of hydropower with the addition of low cost nuclear power, also led
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to a sharp rise in the cost of fuel per kilowatt-hour (39).
The overall trends indicated a rising cost of capital, inadequate rate relief, 
inability to raise productivity, a declining financial situation, and a general 
inability on the part of regulators and management to cope with the economic 
and societal problems at hand.
As the 1980’s began, the electric utility industry was in a weakened 
financial condition. Demand for power had become unstable, and development 
of nuclear power had been arrested. Many utilities had excessive capacity, and 
others depended on fuels that were in short supply or subject to interruption by 
foreign powers. As a result, the electric utility industry seemed ready for a new 
direction.
This new direction was achieved, but the harshness of the lessons that 
brought it to this point, was hard learned. Again, management, and regulators 
were either reluctant to change, or were not attuned to the demand for change. 
Yet in the long run, these lessons made for a more flexible and efficient industry. 
Due to some smart management and marketing, faith in electric utility securities 
has returned to its once secure status.
Finally, what seems to have actually affected our consumption, as much 
as any other factor, is the public perception of increasing energy prices. Our 
exposure to mass media, and especially satellite television, will continue to 
bring national and world crises into the American home, using the current 
Persian Gulf crisis as an example. This phenomenon should be exploited to
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bring solid waste disposal problems to the forefront, in an effort to avoid a 
decline in the quality of American life analogous to the decline of the electric 
utility industry. In the case of solid waste, we, the people, are the 
“management.”
3.3. Solid Waste Parallels.
The same underlying causative factors result in growth or reduction in 
energy consumption and in growth or reduction of the volumes of solid waste 
generated. These generally include, population, social patterns, technological 
changes, and economic changes.
Change in population is one of the most important factors affecting waste 
generation. It underlies all other factors. As the population of the United States 
grows, more and more people are purchasing and discarding manufactured 
materials. Similarly, more and more people are consuming energy.
Franklin Associates, LTD., state that there are basic changes that occur in 
our society that create changes in purchase and discard habits. One of these 
factors is growing affluence. By any measure, the average person in the United 
States has had a significant and steady increase in real purchasing power 
since World War II (40). For example, purchases of goods have risen from $129 
billion in 1945 to $1.5 trillion in 1984, an increase of nearly 1,100 percent (41). 
Likewise, growing affluence causes more people to consume more energy
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through the purchase of more products that use energy; for example, a family of 
two adults and two teenagers, might have four televisions, three stereos, and 
four automobiles.
Other important social factors include the changing perceptions of roles 
and composition of the work force, a change that has caused significant 
alterations in lifestyles in the family home. In those homes with two incomes, 
affluence is a factor in the purchase of more goods. Also, when both adult 
members of a typical married couple work, there is less time to prepare meals 
and perform cleanup chores, often resulting in the purchase of convenience 
foods and disposable items to lighten their chore loads.
Ironically, technological changes affect the reduction and increase in 
waste generation. Technological advances give us the means to more 
efficiently dispose of waste, and simultaneously affect work and leisure habits of 
disposal, as well as the nature of materials disposed. Perhaps the most evident 
example of technological change is in the advent of computers. In just six 
years, 1980 to 1985, the total number of computers installed in the United 
States grew from 1.4 million to 24.2 million, an increase of over 1,600 percent, 
and computer installations are still growing at over 30 percent per year (42). 
This was once labeled as a change that would reduce discards of paper, 
instead it has lead to large increases in the use of computer printers that 
generate paper to be discarded. Another technological change that alters the 
volume and composition of discards is microwave cooking.
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Due to technological advances, energy consuming products become 
increasingly efficient; however, this efficiency is offset, by the increased use of 
such products due to growing population and growing affluence.
In simple terms, waste generation in our era is increasing linearly in a 
similar fashion to energy consumption before the 1970’s, due to similar 
reasons. (This linear growth can be seen in Figure 3-2 of the next section.) As 
noted earlier, the cost of waste removal to the consumer is often artificially low, 
as electric rates were once artificially low. Additionally, environmental and 
economical issues revolving around solid waste generation and disposal are 
beginning to receive the same level of attention that energy generation and 
consumption received at the height of the energy crisis.
Therefore, before beginning the statistical analysis, I conclude that there 
are parallels between the “energy crisis” of the 1970’s and the current “solid 
waste crisis.” Likewise, there are parallels between electric utilities 
management and integrated solid waste management.
3.4. Statistical Regression Analysis.
This analysis is concerned with electrical energy consumption, and what 
effects this energy consumption. It is our contention, that similar relationships 
exist in solid waste disposal. Therefore, we wish to estimate the potential 
reduction in the rate of solid waste generation, based on what we have learned
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about the reduction in the rate of consumption of energy. The questions that we 
want to answer in this this regard, dictate the models that we will use. The 
combination of our data analysis and our previous economical analysis would 
indicate that we need two different regression models, covering two different 
periods: 1960-70, before the industry increased rates or experienced the full 
impact of crisis; and 1960-1988, after rates increased, and the subsequent 
adjustment to the financial, political, societal, and environmental aspects of the 
crisis.
3.4.1. The Statistical Data.
The data for this study were collected from a variety of federal 
publications and from publications of the electric utility industry. There are two 
points to make about this data. First, in general, the statistics presented here is 
data compiled from company reports and other sources on operational and 
financial aspects of the overall electric utility industry. Hence, the data are only 
as good as the reports and sources from which they were complied. Second, 
much of the data available are highly collinear. In fact, ignoring scale, many of 
the plotted data sets appear to be identical when viewing a scatterplot of the 
data. These conflicts with collinearity were dealt with heuristically so that I 
would not have to deal with them in my regression analysis.
With this in mind, I considered the following data as important to the 
analysis: total electric utility industry generation, residential energy sales, gross
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national product (GNP), fuel consumed to produce electric power, average 
KWH used/resident, population, number of ultimate residential customers, 
residential revenues, average cost per KWH sold/resident, consumer price 
index (CPI), personal income, unemployment, and weighted average of yields 
on newly issued preferred stock and domestic bonds (all data is for total electric 
utility industry). These appear to be pertinent data, considering the previous 
discussion of the energy crisis.
From this selection, I have analyzed the data using the all-possible 
regressions method, and have eliminated some of the variables for various 
reasons. Some are dependent on other independent variables, and some 
cause severe multicollinearity problems, since they mean the same thing in 
different scales. For example, revenues, generation, and average KWH used, 
represent consumption in some way. They have no predictive value, and their 
outcomes rely on the following independent variables identified in this study: 
average cost per KWH sold/resident (roughly translated to average price of 
residential electricity), number of residential customers, personal income, GNP, 
population, unemployment, a dummy variable to account for the years of the 
crisis, and weighted average of yields on newly issued preferred stock and 
domestic bonds.
In general, the statistics presented here are data compiled from company 
reports and other sources on operational and financial aspects of the total 
electric utility industry. Therefore, the data are only as good as the reports and 
sources from which they were complied.
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I have defined the variables used in this study as follows:
X1 number of ultimate residential customers 
X2 average cost per KWH sold (resident)
X3 weighted average of yields on newly issued domestic bonds
XA U.S. population
X5 Gross National Product
X6 personal income
X j Consumer Price Index (CPI)
X8 unemployment
3.4.2. Regression Models.
As stated before, we need two different regression models, covering two 
different periods: 1960-70, before the industry increased rates of experiences 
the full impact of crisis; and 1971-1988, after the rate increases and the 
adjustment to the financial, political, societal, and environmental aspects of the 
crisis. In the scattergram below, one can see the erratic nature of the 
dependent variable consumption, between 1971 and 1988, which would not 
have been accounted for in earlier models. Note the similarity between energy 
consumption and solid waste generation in the scattergrams of Figure 3-1 and 
Figure 3-2.
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FIGURE 3-2: Scattergram for Total Wastes Discarded, 1960-87.
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Also, notice that the growth rate of solid waste generation has remained 
relatively constant, except for years in which the same economic factors caused 
a decrease in the growth rate of energy consumption. We have seen that the 
growth rate of energy consumption did change due to electric utility 
management, regulators, and governmental reaction to a deteriorating energy 
situation. Integrated solid waste management could institute similar changes in 
solid waste generation.
3.4.3. Model I: 1960-70.
Using the first regression model, we will answer the following question:
1. How did artificially low electric rates effect the growth rate of 
consumption or total yearly consumption?
2. How did growth in Gross National Product affect consumption, when 
cost of electricity was excluded from the model?
3. What would be our current level of consumption if our model had 
remained valid, i.e., if the decline or crisis had not occurred, and if costs of 
electricity were not a factor?
In building an econometric regression model, I had to take into account 
the questions that I wanted to answer, as well as the economical environment of
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the period. The model considered a dependent variable Yh a constant, the 
regression parameters, and an error term e,. The model followed the following 
form (43):
To insure that all parameters of the model were necessary I analyzed 
them using stepwise regression. Stepwise regression allows the user to input 
all possible variables and the automatic search procedure will identify a single 
regression model as “best” (44).
Using the historical forecasting models of the era, verified by the 
stepwise regression results, I selected the model consisting of variables that 
best reflects the forecasting methodology and theory that might have been 
used. This model consists of independent variable X5 , GNP. The regression 
analysis yielded the following results for the regression model selected:
V/ = A) + AX/1 + P2X/2 + ... + Pp-iXjp.1 +£/
TABLE 3-3: Regression Results for Model I.
Dependent variable is: Consumption.
R2 = 99.9% Readjusted) = 99.9% 
s = 0.2623 with 11 -2  = 9 degrees of freedom








Variable Coefficient s.e. of Coeff
Constant 20.7193 0.3588
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Thus the model becomes:
E [Y (Consumption)] = 20.719 + 0.047 X5 (GNP)
This simple model indirectly represents the how of the cost of electricity 
did not have a major affect on consumption during this period; since it was 
artificially low, and if it continued to be, it would not have effected consumption 
due to the overshadowing effect of GNP. The regression results indicate that 
there is a close relationship between the strength of the economy, here 
measured by GNP, and electricity consumption during this period.
Our current model allows us to answer the first three questions. Since 
electricity costs were decreasing and consumer earnings were increasing and 
the economy was growing, consumption of electricity increased. Indirectly, cost 
of electricity may have had an effect. For instance, since it was so low, it may 
not have constrained consumer spending. Also, with the growth in consumer 
spending, the relative low rate of unemployment, and the growth in population, 
the utility industry gained more residential customers (see data in Appendix B). 
Since cost was not a factor for the growing number of residential customers 
during this period of a growing economy, consumption increased.
Gross National Product was a representative economic indicator during 
this period, and consumption increased at about the same rate. As we can see 
from the residuals, the relationship between consumption and GNP is
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practically linear, and the fit is good (See Table 3-4). This is verified with an R 
value near 1.






1960 44.08 487 .432 43.648
1961 44.73 518.7 -.41 45.14
1962 46.8 560.3 -.299 47.099
1963 48.61 590.5 .089 48.521
1964 50.78 631.7 .32 50.46
1965 52.99 684.9 .025 52.965
1966 55.99 749.9 -.035 56.025
1967 57.89 793.5 -.188 58.078
1968 61.32 864.2 -.087 61.407
1969 64.53 930.3 .011 64.519
1970 66.83 976.4 .141 66.689



















FIGURE 3-3: Regression Scatterplot for Model I.
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If we consider the frame of mind of the regulators and utility management 
in the electric utility industry between 1965 and 1970, we might have used this 
model to predict future consumption. We have noted earlier that the changing 
trend was not apparent to the industry at this time, hence, this model might not 
have been valid for the future.
This choice of models containing the variable discussed, would indicate 
that consumption is dependent primarily on the GNP, with artificially low 
electricity prices in the background. Specifically, it might have been the 
conclusion of management that the growth in customers and the continuing 
increase in consumption would follow the growth the economy, and that the 
industry would continue to flourish economically, as it had before. This model 
would have yielded erroneous results, leading the industry decision makers to 
make false conclusions about future consumption, thus revealing the danger of 
underestimating cost of electricity as an influential factor. Table 3-5 contains the 
fitted values for 1960, 1965, and 1970, and the predicted results for 1971, 1975, 
1980, 1985, and 1988, using our model.
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1960 44.08 487.000 0.432 43.648 •
1965 52.99 684.9 0.095 52.965 •
1970 66.83 976.4 0.141 66.689 •
1 971 * 68.3 1054.9 70.385
1 975* 70.71 1528.8 92.697
1 980* 75.96 2631.7 144.622
1 985* 73.95 3998.1 208.954
1 988* 79.94 4880.6 250.502
* Row excluded from regression model.
It is clear, using a model like this, that in 1985 the industry would have 
expected to see consumption around 209 quadrillion BTU, when in fact it was 
only about 74 quadrillion BTU. If construction of new facilities to meet the 
expected capacity demands had been based on this model output, the industry 
would have folded long ago. Yet, management and regulators were close to 
believing that consumption levels in the future would be as such. Fortunately, 
however, the pressures of the crisis eventually forced management and 
regulators to change.
On page 42, I proposed to answer 3 questions using this model. I will 
now explicitly address these:
1. The model gives us an indirect answer to this question, using the 
above analysis of the error in usisng this model to predict future consumption. 
The model indicates that consumption is a function of GNP, and that other 
factors, such as cost, do not affect consumption. The reason that cost is
T -  4051 48
insignificant in formulating a regression model for this period is the fact that cost 
was decreasing, while affluency was increasing.
2. The model clearly shows that GNP affected consumption: as GNP 
increased, consumption increased. For every unit increase of GNP, there is 
approximately a 3 percent increase in consumption, using the elasticity of this 
variable.
3. The last question is also answered by the model: consumption in 
1988 would have been approximately 250 quadrillion BTU. This is well above 
the actual amount of electricity consumed in 1988, which was approximately 80 
quadrillion BTU.
Neither this model, nor any containing variables that were considered as 
factors affecting consumption by the industry, accurately predict future 
consumption, due to a change in the way that the utilities conducted their 
business after this era, and the changing socio-economic environment. Thus, 
the need for a different model for the period after 1970, was realized.
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3.4.4. Model II: 1960-1988 (Modified).
Using the second regression model we will answer the following 
questions:
1. Did the increase in the price of electricity per KWH decrease the 
growth rate of consumption?
2. Is there now a correlation between electric rates and consumption, or 
are other factors dominating the use of electric energy? For example, what 
were the effects of economic or financial factors?
3. Did energy crisis have any effect on the growth rate of consumption?
Again, in designing the model, I had to consider the questions that I 
wanted to answer. The model considered a dependent variable Y), a constant, 
the regression parameters, and an error term e The model followed the 
following form (45):
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In building a classical linear regression model, I had to consider the five 
underlying econometric assumptions about the way in which the observations 
are generated, as well as the problems associated with violations of these 
assumptions (46). According to Kennedy, these five assumptions are (See 
Appendix C for detailed analysis):
1. The first assumption is that the dependent variable can be calculated 
as a linear function of a specific set of independent variables, plus a 
disturbance term. Violations of this assumption are classified as specification 
errors and include wrong regressors, nonlinearity, and changing parameters.
2. The second assumption is that the expected value of the disturbance 
term is zero. Violation of this assumption leads to a biased intercept problem.
3. The third assumption is that the disturbance terms all have the same 
variance and are not correlated with one another. Two problems associated 
with a violation of this assumption are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated 
errors.
4. The fourth assumption is that the observations on the independent 
variable can be considered fixed with repeated samples; i.e., it is possible to 
repeat the sample with the same independent variables. There are three 
problems associated with the violation of this assumption: errors in variables, 
autoregression, and simultaneous equation estimation.
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5. The fifth assumption is that the number of observations is greater than 
the number of independent variables and that there are no linear relationships 
between the independent variables. The problem of multicollinearity is 
associated with this assumption.
To insure that all parameters of the model were necessary I analyzed 
them using the all-possible regressions procedure. Additionally, economic 
theory was considered in including some variables that did not seem to be 
significant from a pure mathematical viewpoint. Here the model covers the 
period 1960 to 1988. The industry was forced to change its operational 
philosophy after 1970, as explained earlier, and hence a second model is 
needed.
To develop this model, two additional variables were added to the 
previous list: X 9 Dummy variable (energy crisis years) and X 10 Lag of 
consumption (1 year). The complete set of variables follows:
*1 Number of ultimate residential customers
x 2 Average cost per KWH sold (1967 Dollars)
*3 Weighted average of yields on newly issued domestic bonds
x 4 U.S. population
*5 Gross National Product (1967 Dollars)
*6 Personal income (1967 Dollars)
*7 Consumer Price Index (CPI)
*8 Unemployment
*9 Dummy variable (energy crisis years)
*10 Lag of consumption (1 year)
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Using the all-possible regressions procedure, I selected a model 
containing the variables (number of residential customers), X2 (average price 
of electricity per KWH), X5 Gross National Product (GNP), X9 Dummy variable 
(energy crisis years), and X10 Lag of consumption (1 year). Since we want to 
examine elasticities, the model is estimated in log-log form (47). The model 
now takes on the following definition:
ln[E{Y} ]  = -1.71 + 0.525 X, (# of Customers) -  0.352 X2 (Avg. Cost/KWH) +
0.129 X5 (G N P )-0.012 X9 (Dummy)+ 0.571 X10(Lag)
The regression results for this model follow in Table 3-6:
TABLE 3-6: Regression Results for Model II.
Dependent variable is: ln(x) of Consumption
R2 = 98.5% Readjusted) = 98.2% 
s = 0.0249 with 28 - 6 = 22 degrees of freedom
Source Sum of Squares df
Regression 0.911602 5 0.182320 293
Residual 0.013671 22 0.000621
Variable Coefficient s.e. of Coeff t-ratio
Constant -1.70614 0.7920 -2.15
ln(x) of Resident. Customers 0.524581 0.2179 2.41
ln(x) of Avg. Price/KWH -0.351696 0.1183 -2.97
ln(x) of GNP 0.129062 0.1810 0.713
Lag of ln(x) of Consumption 0.570500 0.1453 3.08
Dummy -0.012332 0.0158 -0.781
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Quite frequently in economics we may be interested in interpreting the 
effect of a percentage change of an independent variable on the dependent 
variable. The notion of the elasticity of a variable is used for this purpose. 
Elasticities are easily obtained after a logarithmic transformation of both 
dependent and independent variables has taken place. We obtain the 
elasticities by taking the coefficient of the variable we want to examine (48).
In this case, the cost of electricity is a direct factor, and it contributes to the 
reduction of the growth rate of consumption. Each time the cost of electricity 
rises by one standard deviation the growth rate of consumption decreases by
0.35%; i.e., for every 20 increase in price per KWR, consumption will decrease 
by 0.35%. It is important to note that growth rate of consumption, and not 
consumption itself, decreases with an increase in cost of the service, due to the 
other factors in the model. Consumption continues to grow with the increase in 
residential customers, a growing CPI, and the previous year's consumption 
trend. When an energy crisis occurs and electricity costs increase, consumption 
would decrease, if the other factors in the model remain constant. However, if 
residential customers continue to grow, for example, consumption will not 
decrease, but the growth rate of consumption will begin to decrease. Pictorially, 
the slope of the line of our consumption graph would become less steep.
To make a more bold statement about elasticities, we would want to 
consider long-run elasticities. The long-run elasticity of price per KWH is 
obtained by (49):
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In p (price)
Long-run Elasticity of Pnce = ----------- a-------------------
1 -  In p (lagged Y)
Here our long-run elasticity for price per KWH is 0.82, that is, in the 
long-run, for every increase in standard deviation of price per KWH, there will 
be a 0.82% decrease in consumption. For this model, we find that Price is 
inelastic in the short-run, but is relatively elastic in the long-run, which conforms 
to our understanding of economic theory.
On page 49, I proposed to answer 3 questions using this model. I will 
now explicitly address these:
1. The increase in the price of electricity per kwh is a factor causing a 
decrease in the growth rate of consumption. This is no surprise, since we have 
seen this from an economic argument. The model shows that for every increase 
in standard deviation of the price per kwh of electricity, there is a 0.35% short­
term decrease in the consumption of electricity. Using long-run elasticities, we 
saw that there is a 0.82% decrease in consumption of electricity for every 
standard deviation increase in price per kwh. Finally, our confidence interval at 
a 5 percent level of significance is between 0.74% and 1.48% in the long-run.
2. There appears to be a correlation between consumption and the 
other factors in the model. The model shows that as GNP increases, 
consumption increases. The same is true for the number of residential 
customers and the previous year’s consumption level. However, as price per
flRTSTOS LAOS LIBRASTC 
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kwh increases and the factors of energy crisis are introduced, consumption 
decreases. The overall effect is a decrease in the growth rate of consumption 
rather than an actual decrease in consumption levels. Examination of 
correlation coefficients of the dependent variable, consumption, and the 
independent variables in the model support the analysis that there is a 
correlation of these factors to electricity consumption.







Consumption 0.755 0.625 0.805 0.884 0.490
3. Using a dummy variable for the effect of energy crisis years, the 
regression results show that there is a decrease in electricity consumption 
associated with the presence of energy crisis factors. Again, we can see this by 
examining the elasticity associated with this variable. This reinforces the 
previous economic analysis of the energy crisis.
Going back to our discussion of the crisis and the decline of the electric 
utility industry, I noted that management and regulators did not believe the 
increase in the price for power would affect the long-term demand for 
consumption. Although there are other factors (i.e., political, environmental,
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economical), the increased cost of electricity, and other energy as well, 
encouraged a more conservative use of electricity, and will tend to in the future.
If we use these findings to make a parallel projection about the effect of 
cost of services on solid waste disposal, we need to have similar conditions 
occurring. I have shown earlier the similarity between the “energy crisis” and 
the “solid waste crisis.” Further, we have seen the comparisons of an integrated 
solid waste management system with a typical electric utility. In general, we 
know from economic theory that price does affect consumption, so we would 
tend to believe our analysis (50).
Now, if we consider what percentage effect which cost of waste removal 
would have on waste disposal, we would need to have the standard deviation 
of the cost of those services. Since we do not have this data, the following 
hypothetical situation can be posed. Let’s say that in a certain region trash 
collection costs the average resident $20.00 per month, and that the standard 
deviation is 500. Given the conditions that we have considered up to this point, 
it is possible that a 500 increase in the cost of trash collection could cause a
0.35% decrease (from our short-term elasticity) in the amount of solid waste that 
residents in the region would dispose of, over a short-term, if they are aware of 
the solid waste disposal crisis. This reduction in solid waste disposal does not 
necessarily mean that less garbage is thrown out, since some of this may be 
diverted to recycling. We could expect a 0.82% long-run decrease (from our 
long-run elasticity) in solid waste disposal for each 500 increase in the cost of 
residential solid waste removal, in this case.
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If we took this hypothetical example and our analysis and tried to guess 
the effects of an integrated solid waste management system, with the “pay as 
you throw” concept (51), we would be in the ball-park if we said that for each 
increase in the standard deviation of cost of residential solid waste removal, 
what ever that might be, there will be between a 0.74% to 1.48% corresponding 
decrease in the amount of solid waste disposed of by residential customers, that 
is in the long-run, cost of services would be relatively elastic.
To conclude this analysis, it is important to understand the overall picture 
involved here, not just the statistics. Again consider all the factors involved in 
the decline of the electric utility industry, which led to the change in the industry. 
The four major events discussed earlier, the Northeastern Blackout, Arab Oil 
Embargo, the Omission of Consolidated Edison Stock Dividends, and the Three 
Mile Island Nuclear accident, brought about the changes that occurred. The 
variables considered in this analysis had the effect that has been indicated due 
to the changes caused by the larger occurrences. It is important to note that the 
price of electricity may not have had the same effect on consumption, without 
the “energy crisis” occurring.
It is equally important to consider the overall picture present for the “solid 
waste” crisis and the integrated solid waste management system. Cost of 
services, considered by itself, might not affect solid waste generation. For the 
integrated solid waste management system, cost of services could effect solid 
waste generation, given the similarities of the parallel solid waste crisis.
T -  4051 58
CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis as defined in the abstract was to (a) analyze 
the electric utility industry during the energy crisis of the 1970’s and (b) compare 
the various factors and the operation of utilities during this crisis with current 
trends in solid waste management. This thesis has shown, statistically, that 
there are definable functional relationships between electricity consumption 
and various factors of the energy crisis. This was done by defining a causal 
forecasting model supporting these conclusions. We determined that 
increasing electric prices influenced a corresponding decrease in the growth 
rate of residential energy consumption. This was done to support our 
hypothesis that a similar relationship exists between the cost of solid waste 
disposal and the growth rate of solid waste generation.
To illustrate that unlearned lessons of the energy crisis can easily 
reappear in solid waste management we recall that the east coast public utilities 
only became seriously concerned with insufficient capacity a fte r  the great 
blackout of 1965. Not long after the Northeast blackout occurred, and 
corrections were instituted by utilities and municipalities, a great Northeast 
“waste-out” occurred (the capacity for solid waste disposal was exceeded). It 
did not register to the authorities of that region that lack of capacity applies to 
more than just generating capacity of electric utilities, for suddenly they were 
surprised by their shortage of capacity to dispose of solid waste. An illustration
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of the time remaining for landfill capacity appeared in Newsweek Newsweek. 










Figure 4-1: How Much Time Remains?
More than two thirds of the nation’s landfills have closed since the late 
1970’s. One third of those remaining will be full in the next five years. The 
Northeast is perhaps in the most critical condition: New York, Pennsylvania, 
and New Jersey export 8 million tons of garbage a year —  they have no place 
to put it (52). It is estimated that Colorado has 5 to 10 years of remaining landfill 
capacity. To the average person this may appear to be a long time; to municipal 
planners, it may be only a speck in the sand.
We may make solid waste comparisons, and the factors that are facing 
us, to the factors that affected the decline and renewal of the electric utilities.
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Environmental pressure is certainly present and at the forefront of public 
recognition. Making landfills beautiful, like making power plants beautiful, is not 
the issue. The solid waste environmental issues must be cured, not merely 
treated.
Alternative means of power generation were a key issue to the electric 
utilities. In solid waste management, we are concerned with alternative means 
of disposal. The capacity issue has to eventually push us to full integrated 
exploitation of these alternatives, i.e., incineration, recycling, composting, etc. 
With these alternatives come more environmental issues, so that it would seem 
that we’re in a never ending circle of issues.
Utility management and regulators doubted the effect of increase energy 
costs to inspire the American public to reduce energy consumption. 
Consumption had risen, as we have seen, due to the low cost of electricity and 
the affluence of the American people. Electric prices were low, and dropping, in 
spite of increasing cost of living, real GNP, and fuel prices. Management and 
regulators never connected the fact that demand was not as much based of the 
desire for comfort as it was on the price of comfort. So when prices went up, 
they assumed that demand would continue at a constant growth rate.
It has been mentioned that the cost of solid waste disposal is artificially 
low in many respects. We must ask ourselves, whether we are falling into the 
same pitfalls as the electric utilities fell into from 1965-80. Will our habits of 
solid waste disposal continue to cause an increase in tonnage per capita each
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year? This study suggests that the answer may lie in placing a disproportionate 
cost burden on the consumer, or in this case the producer of solid waste.
The lack of a coordinated plan, either locally or on a broader scale, 
harassed the electric utility industry’s efforts for progress. One of the chief 
criticisms coming out of the energy crisis, was that planning at federal and state 
levels were insufficient. This was considered one of the factors that turned “a 
problem” into a “crisis.”
Our planning for solid waste management must be coordinated at every 
level in order to avoid the pitfalls of the past. Municipal planning is needed, but 
alone is insufficient. For example, as the capacities of Colorado landfills are 
exceeded, this will become a Colorado problem. Further, we are now faced 
with frequent proposals to transship waste from state to state. Thus state 
planners should rally to execute preventive short term planning, and long term 
planning that will solve the problem once and for all. If a problem resurfaces in 
time, then the problem was never really solved to start with.
Although the two problems are not identical, they are similar enough to 
draw the parallels that we have made in this study and thereby make 
implications to future solid waste management policies. We have seen that the 
price of electricity is relatively elastic in the long-run, and have concluded from 
our analysis that the costs of services for solid waste disposal would also be 
relatively elastic in the long-run. Furthermore, we have concluded that the 
impact of applying the full cost of integrated services directly to the consumer,
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could decrease the growth rate of solid waste disposal.
In any case, the long-run growth rate of solid waste generation could 
decrease under an integrated solid waste management system. Based on the 
work of this thesis, we make the following annotated recommendations.
1. Adopt an integrated solid waste management system.
Comment: The question here is will continued “disintegration” solve the 
problem. We must look for alternatives.
2. Consolidate ownership of the solid waste management system to a 
single entity, either public or private.
Comment: Free enterprise can be protected through franchising,
especially for curbside services. In fact, competition is essential in this area. 
However, it is important to remember that the connection of the Mafia with 
garbage collection in the industrialized east coast is well documented.
3. Establish a clear hierarchy of solid waste management tools to be 
implemented.
Comment: Again the issue here is determination of tools that make it 
easier for the generators of solid waste to be more motivated to do right than to 
do wrong.
4. Establish blended rates based on variations in type of customer, level 
of use, and type of waste management behavior to be encouraged.
T -  4051 63
Comments: Here it has been well proven that perception of fairness is of 
greater importance than real fairness.
5. Establish equitable cost allocation through State Utilities Commission 
regulation.
Comment:: In my opinion the European experience has been to form a 
consortium of the public utilities commission and major generators of solid 
waste to hammer out acceptable rules of operation. This has resulted in 
legislation that has operated without the recurring scandals often taking place in 
solid waste management in the U.S.
6. Establish a financing structure allowing economically stable 
implementation of policy-directed alternatives based on total system cost, not 
stand-alone cost of a single element or potentially competing alternative.
To summarize, based on this thesis, we have made some suggested 
policy proposals for dealing with the solid waste crisis. These 
recommendations have come after the determination of two statistical models of 
electric power consumption during the energy crisis. Based on these models 
and other comparisons presented in this work, we assert the following: That 
many of the factors and policy changes of the energy crisis can be translated 
into similar policy recommendations to deal with the growing solid waste crisis .
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS
AFUDC: Financial analysts also judge utilities on the basis of another item in 
the income statement—the allowance for funds used during construction  
(AFUDC). Companies that are building plants must raise money to finance the 
plant during the construction process and must pay interest and dividends on 
that money.
Balance sheet: the status of all capital accounts at any one time is reported 
on a balance sheet
Common stock: Securities which represent an ownership interest in a
corporation.
Curvilinear: not linear.
CWIP: A plant that has not been completed is called construction work in 
progress (CWIP).
Dependent variable: sometimes called response variable, the dependent 
variable is estimated from the occurrence of an independent event.
Dilution: Dilution  takes place when so many new shares have to be sold to 
pay for expansion that earnings per share of stock are less than they would 
have been had no expansion and financing taken place. Dilution usually 
occurs when the market value of the stock (the price at which it sells) is less 
than the book value (the amount of money per share that common stockholders 
have already invested in the business and any earnings that have been 
retained or saved by the company).
Economies of scale: the natural monopoly provides economies o f scale — 
that is, one large utility can produce and sell electricity more cheaply than could 
a number of small producers.
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Equity: the ownership interest of common and preferred stockholders in a 
company.
Kilowatt-hour (KWH): the amount of electricity produced by running a 
generator that is one kilowatt in size for one hour. Sales of electricity are thus 
measured in kilowatt-hours.
Margin: the amount paid by the customer when he uses his broker’s credit to 
buy a security.
Peak: The time at which demand for electricity is highest is the peak.
Preferred stock: a class of stock with a claim on the company’s earnings 
before payment is made on the common stock and usually entitled to priority 
over common stock if the company liquidates.
Regression Function: The systematic statistical relationship between a 
dependent variable Y and its tendency to vary with the independent variable X, 
referred to as the regression function of Y on X.
Regulatory agency: Because a utility has a monopoly, a regulatory agency 
in each state assures that utilities do not take advantage of their customers. The 
agencies often set service standards and always set prices. The price (rate) is 
set to permit the utility to collect enough money to cover all operating expenses, 
including taxes, and to have enough operating income left to provide a fair rate 
o f return on the money invested in the business.
Reserve Margin: The reserve m argin  is the reserve measured as a 
percentage of the peak load.
Residual: the i th residual is the difference between the observed value Y,- and 
the corresponding fitted Yh
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APPENDIX B 
DATA
This appendix contains the data which was used to conduct this analysis. 
The data was derived from a variety of sources, and are indicated as such in the 
notes of this appendix.
TABLE B-1: Energy Consumption and Related Data.
Personal Residential Total Kwhr Kwhr
Year Consume Income Sales Sales Resident Total Population
1960 44.08 392.0 196.4 683.199 3854 11704 180.684
1961 44.73 417.6 209.021 720.728 4019 12099 183.756
1962 46.8 442.6 226.414 776.088 4259 12763 186.656
1963 48.61 465.5 241.692 830.811 4442 13366 189.417
1964 50.78 496.0 262.01 890.356 4703 14015 192.12
1965 52.99 538.9 280.97 953.441 4933 14694 194.592
1966 55.99 587.2 306.572 1038.982 5265 15678 196.907
1967 57.89 629.4 331.525 1107.023 5577 16384 199.119
1968 61.32 688.9 367.692 1202.321 6057 17445 201.177
1969 64.53 750.9 407.922 1307.178 6571 18563 203.213
1970 66.83 806.3 447.795 1391.359 7066 19380 204.88
1971 68.3 864.0 479.08 1466.441 7380 19956 207.05
1972 71.63 944.9 511.423 1577.714 7691 20964 208.85
1973 74.61 1055.0 554.171 1703.203 8079 21955 210.41
1974 72.76 1154.9 554.96 1700.769 7907 21448 211.9
1975 70.71 1255.5 586.149 1733.024 8176 21417 213.56
1976 74.51 1380.9 613.072 1849.625 8360 22361 215.14
1977 76.33 1538.0 652.345 1950.791 8693 23052 216.82
1978 78.09 1721.8 679.156 2017.818 8849 23315 222.3
1979 78.9 1943.8 695.996 2084.4 8843 23481 225.034
1980 75.96 2165.3 734.441 2126.094 9025 23167 227.738
1981 73.99 2429.5 730.479 2152.506 8825 23026 228.465
1982 70.85 2584.6 732.678 2103.281 8743 22197 231.384
1983 70.52 2838.6 750.293 2163.124 8814 22479 233.529
1984 74.1 3110.2 782.608 2283.143 8978 23152 236.681
1985 73.95 3314.5 792.875 2310.847 8906 22903 239.573
1986 74.24 3436.7 820.015 2359.56 9090 23071 •
1987 76.77 3777.6 846.457 2441.364 9236 23472 •
1988 79.94 4064.5 885.146 2556.976 9495 24144 •
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TABLE B-1: Energy Consumption and Related Data (continued).
Residential Revenue Revenue/
Year Customers (Resident) Kwhr to) UnemDloy £EL Bonds GNP
1960 51446 .47 4855.77 2.47 6.1 88.7 4.72 487.0
1961 52569.05 5115.80 2.45 6.7 89.6 4.72 518.7
1962 53649 .36 5457.61 2.41 5.6 90.6 4.40 560.3
1963 55073.05 5722.54 2.37 5.7 91.7 4.40 590.5
1964 56307.19 6040.68 2.31 5.2 92.9 4.55 631.7
1965 57596.01 6328.75 2.25 4.5 94.5 4.61 684.9
1966 58826.28 6733.71 2.20 3.8 97.2 5.53 749.9
1967 60033.40 7183.91 2.17 3.8 100.0 6.07 793.5
1968 61439.03 7802.03 2.12 3.6 104.2 6.80 864.2
1968 62598.91 8532.72 2.09 3.5 109.8 7.98 930.3
1970 64017.66 9415.71 2.10 4.9 116.3 8.79 976.4
1971 65650.04 10483.52 2.19 5.9 121.3 7.72 1054.9
1972 67314.00 11729.83 2.29 5.6 125.3 7.50 1158.0
1973 69438.42 13194.77 2.38 4.9 133.1 7.91 1294.9
1974 70949.60 15702.85 2.83 5.6 147.7 9.59 1412.9
1975 72570.18 18803.15 3.21 8.5 161.2 9 .97 1528.8
1976 74161.84 21149.59 3.45 7.7 170.5 8.92 1700.1
1977 75923.14 24687.50 3.78 7.1 181.5 8.43 1918.0
1978 77775.66 27381.41 4.03 6.0 195.3 9.30 2156.1
1979 79620.18 30798.69 4.43 5.8 217.7 10.85 2413.9
1980 82153 .16 37580 .89 5.12 7.1 247.1 13.46 2631.7
1981 83304.35 42824 .45 5.86 7.6 272.5 16.31 2957.8
1982 84371 .77 47188 .12 6.44 9.7 289.4 14.93 3069.2
1983 85842.19 51226 .24 6.83 9.6 298.7 12.70 3405.7
1984 87938 .99 56116 .14 7.17 7.5 311.5 14.25 3765.0
1985 89819 .72 58591.75 7.39 7.2 322.8 11.83 3998.1
1986 90994 .58 60910 .60 7.43 7.0 328.9 9.61 4206.1
1987 92399 .32 63049.05 7.45 6.2 340.7 9.74 4524.3
1988 93867.73 66274.43 7.49 5.5 354.7 10.03 4880.6
Notes:
1 . Convert all dollar variables to 1967 dollars by dividing by the CPI .
2. CPI, Bonds and Unemployment are expressed as percentages (53).
3. Consumption (energy) is expressed in quadrillion BTU (54).
4. Residential customers is expressed in thousands (55).
5. GNP is expressed in billions of dollars (56).
6 . All other dollar figures are expressed in millions of dollars, except where 
noted (57).
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TABLE B-2: Products Discarded Into The Municipal Waste Stream
(In m illions of tons)
Products 1960 1965i 1970 1975 1MQ 1951 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Durables Goods 9.1 10.1 13.9 15.9 17.8 18.2 18.9 19.0 18.6 18.0 19.2
Nondurables
Goods 15.1 19.2 21.4 20.3 28.6 29.4 28.2 31.3 33.0 34.2 35.4
Packaging/Containers
Glass 5.9 8.0 11.7 12.3 13.2 13.3 12.3 12.3 11.7 11.1 10.7
Steel 4.5 4.7 5.3 4.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7
Aluminum 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Paper 11.0 14.9 17.4 16.3 18.1 19.1 17.9 19.3 20.3 19.9 20.4
Plastics 0.1 1.0 2.1 2.3 4.2 4.3 4.2 4 .6 5.0 5.3 5.6
Wood 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1
Miscillaneous 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Food Wastes 12.2 12.4 12.8 13.4 11.9 12.1 12.0 12.0 12.2 12.3 12.5
Yard Wastes 20.3 21.6 23.2 25.2 26.5 26.7 27.0 27.5 27.3 28.0 28.3
Miscillaneous 
Inorganic Waste i a 1A ZA ZA ZA ZA ZA ZA ZA ZA
Total
Waste Discarded 81 .7 96.1 112.5 116.2 129.2 131.6 129.1 134.5 138.3 137.3 140.8
Enerav Recoverv - SLZ ZA ZJ. 2J. ZA 3.5 £ 4 6.5 IA 9.6
Net Waste 
Discarded 81.7 9.5,9 112.1 115.5 126 .5  1 2 9 .1 1 2 5 .6  129 .5  13.1.3 129.7 131,2
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APPENDIX C 
ANALYSIS OF MODELS
This appendix contains the detailed regression analysis for the 
regression models , using Data Desk Professional, a statistical computer 
package for the Macintosh computer. First, I show the regression results. Then I 
show the detailed results and analysis of the models that I selected as “best” for 
the analysis. Analysis of Model II shows conformance with the assumptions of 
the classical linear regression model, validating our model as a good 
regression model.
C.1. Model I.
This model meets all the requirements for the classical linear regression 
model, and due to its simplicity, the calculations are not presented. The model 
is summarized by the following tables and figures.
TABLE C-1: Model I Regression Results.
Regression Results:
Dependent variable is: Consumption.
R2 = 99.9% Readjusted) = 99.9%
s = 0.2623 with 11 -2  = 9 degrees of freedom
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-ratta
Regression 624.138 1 624 9071
Residual 0.619256 9 0.068806
Variable Coefficient s.e. of Coeff t-ratio
Constant 20.7193 0.3588 57.7
G N P 0.047081 0.0005 95.2
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TABLE C-2: Model I Regression Data.
Electricity Fitted
Year Consumption GNP Residuals Values
1960 44.08 487 .432 43.648
1961 44.73 518.7 -.41 45.14
1962 46.8 560.3 -.299 47.099
1963 48.61 590.5 .089 48.521
1964 50.78 631.7 .32 50.46
1965 52.99 684.9 .025 52.965
1966 55.99 749.9 -.035 56.025
1967 57.89 793.5 -.188 58.078
1968 61.32 864.2 -.087 61.407
1969 64.53 930.3 .0 1 1 64.519
1970 66.83 976.4 .141 66.689



















FIGURE C-1: Model I Regression Scatterplot.
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C.2. Model II.
This part of the appendix gives the detailed number crunching for the 
regression results in Chapter 3.3. We will examine the assumptions of the 
classical linear regression model mention in Chapter 3.3, and derive the long 
run elasticities that were used. We will also show the regression results for both 
the log-log model and the model before natural logarithms were applied.
TABLE C-3: Regression Results for Log-Log Model.
Dependent variable is: 
2FT = 98.5% 
s = 0.0249 with
ln(x) of Consumption
Readjusted) = 98.2%
28 - 6 = 22 degrees of freedom
Source Sum,of Squares, dJL .Mean.Sajare fcratio
Regression 0.911602 5 0.182320 293
Residual 0.013671 22 0.000621
Variable Coefficient s.e.ofCoeff t-ratio Probability
Constant -1.70614 0.7920 -2.15
ln(Resident. Customers) 0.524581 0.2179 2.41 0.0249
ln(Avg. Price/KWH) -0.351696 0.1183 -2.97 0.007
In(GNP) 0.129062 0.1810 0.713 0.4834
ln(Lag of Consumption) 0.570500 0.1853 3.08 0.0055
Dummy -0.012332 0.0158 -0.781 0.4434
Variable 95% Lower 95% ItoDer 90% Lower 90% UDDer Partial F.
ln(Residential Customers) 0.073 0.977 0.15 0.899 5.796
ln(Avg. Price/KWH) -0.597 -0.106 -0.555 -0.149 8.837
In(GNP) -0.505 0.246 -0.44 0.182 0.508
ln(Lag of Consumption) 0.186 0.955 0.252 0.889 9.482
Dummy -0.045 0.02 -0.039 0.015 0.609
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TABLE C-4: Model II (log-log) Regression Data.
Residuals Predicted Leverages Int Stud Res Ext Stud Res
0.02443173 3.7615683 0.35593081 1.3026407 1.3259459
0.00080929 3 .8001907 0.24524912 0.03986003 0.03890088
0.00739160 3 .8386084 0.17606557 0.34844082 0.34103068
-0.00162392 3.8856239 0.15457439 -0.07557268 -0.07376142
-0.00323083 3.9312308 0.17052143 -0.15179178 -0.14821494
-0.01270779 3.9827078 0.15757814 -0.59243645 -0.58305169
-0.00334815 4.0283482 0.16524036 -0.15680546 -0.15311613
-0.01828303 4.0772830 0.10756504 -0.82812639 -0.82169698
-0.01784773 4.1338477 0.08212755 -0.79712882 -0.78996112
-0.01402768 4.1810277 0.14532835 -0.64926630 -0.64007593
-0.01800109 4.2200011 0.28165514 -0.90880161 -0.90487214
-0.02949128 4.2534913 0.20570621 -1.4159232 -1.4528916
-0.00851655 4.2805165 0.15769167 -0.39706790 -0.38896146
0.01385489 4.2981451 0.34890664 0.73471345 0.72640378
0.03906140 4.2479386 0.34126120 2.0593393 2.2496620
-0.00448824 4.2634882 0.38372994 -0.24463999 -0.23908512
0.01013315 4.3008668 0.15750151 0.47238556 0.46347012
0.02325356 4.3117464 0.28483575 1.1765850 1.1880562
0.02681138 4.3311886 0.23664601 1.3130852 1.3375241
0.03744380 4.3305562 0.16904731 1.7576339 1.8573206
0.02474841 4.3052516 0.13778542 1.1404503 1.1491194
0.02655694 4.2774431 0.21241469 1.2804596 1.3014379
-0.00676732 4.2677673 0.20654092 -0.32508047 -0.31804731
-0.03138945 4.2873894 0.24230346 -1.5430241 -1.5992216
-0.01705135 4.3220513 0.43862259 -0.97379580 -0.97253907
-0.01301655 4.3160165 0.23025760 -0.63483331 -0.62556560
-0.03470520 4.3417052 0.20491318 -1.6654208 -1.7445718
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TABLE C-5: Regression Results for Model II (Normal Model).
Dependent variable is: Consumption
2 Readjusted) = 95.8%
29 - 6 = 23 degrees of freedom
R = 96.6%  
s = 2.310 with
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TABLE C-6: Model II (Normal) Regression Data.
Residuals Predicted Leverages ISludRes EStudRes
1.8391484 42.240852 0.25513179 0.92248960 0.91938123
0.69965726 44.030343 0.21350406 0.34152424 0.33486748
0.63849090 46.161509 0.16900518 0.30320753 0.29713727
0.06355786 48.546442 0.13713829 0.02961987 0.02896935
-0.44637397 51.226374 0.10530327 -0.20428918 -0.19998028
-1.1870208 54.177021 0.09428154 -0.53994080 -0.53145146
-1.1737015 57.163701 0.12150223 -0.54209045 -0.53359465
-1.9985278 59.888528 0.09678553 -0.91033068 -0.90680720
-2.1067318 63.426732 0.10925183 -0.96630942 -0.96485783
-2.1212651 66.651265 0.11832447 -0.97796875 -0.97700162
-2.4806075 69.310607 0.21744468 -1.2139057 -1.2271856
-2.3913009 70.691301 0.19041345 -1.1505010 -1.1590584
-0.01396942 71.643969 0.12472018 -0.00646382 -0.00632175
1.2713035 73.338697 0.13254704 0.59089552 0.58234434
2.8897141 69.870286 0.29931756 1.4944407 1.5381789
0.72743803 69.982562 0.18503373 0.34882742 0.34206599
2.0414074 72.468593 0.13899250 0.95238083 0.95037483
3.6374822 72.692518 0.13568840 1.6937532 1.7706252
3.8717155 74.218284 0.16918174 1.8388015 1.9471970
3.5062825 75.393718 0.10886467 1.6079017 1.6691672
1.8870650 74.072935 0.19316094 0.90944794 0 .90589506
0 .97825716 73.011743 0.16961152 0.46472583 0.45665990
-1.4354607 72.285461 0.35616158 -0.77443911 -0.76748915
-2.0225705 72.542571 0.14897966 -0.94911347 -0.94698121
-1.2729512 75.372951 0.26152003 -0.64124918 -0.63283659
-0.89710802 74.847108 0.21692470 -0.43886143 -0.43102341
-2.1273351 76.367335 0.30674324 -1.1060463 -1.1117035
-3.9301776 80.700178 0.28644657 -2.0141108 -2.1705322
AMTHUB LAKES LIBRARY COLOMBO -
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C.2.1. Evaluation of Assumptions.
Before I begin this analysis, it is important to keep in mind that real world 
models seldom, if ever, are perfect, and therefore almost never satisfy all the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model to perfection. Hence, I will 
be satisfied that our model is efficient, if the assumptions are not seriously 
violated.
Assumption 1 . The first assumption is that the dependent variable can be 
calculated as a linear function of a specific set of independent variables, plus a 
disturbance term. Violations of this assumption are classified as specification 
errors and include wrong regressors, nonlinearity, and changing parameters.
First, it does not appear that there is an omission of relevant independent 
variables from the model, due to the programs ability to perform various model 
selection routines, as well as an underlying understanding of economic theory.
However, it would appear from some of the t-values and partial F values, 
that there irrelevant independent variables in the model, namely, GNP and our 
Dummy variable representing the occurrence of the energy crises. In spite of 
what appears from a quantitative viewpoint, these variables are necessary 
according to our economic analysis, and we are willing to accept the minor 
consequences of their inclusion. Inclusion of these variables could result in 
less efficient ordinary least squares estimates, but the estimators and their 
variance-covariance matrix remain unbiased. Inclusion of these variables is 
less severe than excluding a relevant independent variable.
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In order to examine whether a regression relationship exists, I have used 
the generalized F test where the test statistic is:
_ SSE(R) - SSE(F) SSE(F)




Testing whether there is a regression relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables in the model, we have:
H o  : P i =  P2 =  P3 =  P4 =  P5 =  0-
H1 : not all pk (k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) equal zero.
level of significance: a= .05 n = 28, p = 6 .
F* < F(0.95; 5, 22) = 2.62, do not reject H0.
F* > F(0.95; 5, 22) = 2.62, reject H0.
660.0
F = 3 ^0 8 6 7  = 1 7 3 2 8 8  > 2 '6 2
Conclusion: Reject H0.
Thus our test would imply that our variables, residential customers, 
average Price/kwh, GNP, lag of consumption, and the dummy variable for the 
energy crises, are related to consumption.
To test for Lack of Fit of our model, we have:
H0: E{Y} = p0 + ftX ! + p2X2 + p3X3 + p4X4 + p5X5 .
H-i: E{Y} *  p0 + PiX, + P2X2 + p3X3 + p4X4 + p5X5 .
In order to evaluate the hypotheses, I used Minitab on the VAX due to the 
amount of memory required for the test. Minitab could not perform a pure error 
test, so I used the subcommand XLOF. This test yielded the following results:
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TABLE C-7: Lack of Fit Test.
Possible curvature in variable Number of Customers (P = 0.000) 
Possible interactions with variable Number of Customers (P = 0.048) 
Possible curvature in variable Average Price/KWH (P = 0.000) 
Possible interactions with variable Average Price/KWH (P =0.000) 
Possible curvature in variable GNP (P = 0.004)
Possible interactions with variable GNP (P = 0.000)
Overall lack of fit test is significant at P = 0 . 0 0 0
Hence, we can conclude not to reject the null hypothesis, that is there is 
no serious violation in the fit of the model. Therefore, we can conclude that 
there is no serious violation of Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 . The second assumption is that the expected value of the 
disturbance term is zero. Violation of this assumption leads to a biased 
intercept problem.
To evaluate whether the assumption has been violated, I have regressed 
the predicted values from our model against the residuals, and examined the 
estimated coefficients and coefficient of correlation. Additionally, the 
coefficients of correlation were evaluated for each independent variable and the 
residuals.
Here, it is clear that the assumption has not been violated, since all these 
values are zero or close to zero.
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TABLE C-8: Residual Regression Results.
Dependent variable is: Residuals
29 total cases of which 1 are missing
R2= -0.0% Readjusted) = -3.8%  
s = 1.795 with 2 8 - 2  = 26 degrees of freedom
Source Sum ol Squares. d i MfianS.qu.aia Eiiatio 
Regression -0.000000 1 -0.000000 -0.000
Residual 83.7907 26 3.22272
Variable Coefficient s ^ o l Coeff t-calio 
Constant 0 .000000 2.093 0.000
Predicted -0.000000 0.0312 -0.000



















Assumption 3. The third assumption of the CLR model is that the 
disturbance terms all have the same variance and are not correlated with one 
another. These characteristics are usually described in terms of the variance- 
covariance matrix of the disturbance vector. The diagonal terms are the 
variances of the individual disturbances, and the off-diagonal terms are the
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covariances between them. If all the diagonal terms are the same, the 
disturbances are said to be homoskedastic. If the diagonal terms are not all the 
same, the disturbances are said to be heteroskedastic; the disturbance term is 
then thought of as being drawn from a different distribution for each observation.
I have computed the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance terms 
as s2{e} = MSE ( I - H ), where H is the Hat matrix computed by H = X (XTX) ' 1 XT. 
Here s2{e} will be a square matrix with 28 rows and 28 columns. In this case the 
diagonal terms, s2{e}[i,i], are:
s2{e}[1,1] = 0.1323 s2{e}[15,15] = 0.1476
S2{e}[2,2] = 0.1424 s2{e}[16,16] = 0.1506
s2{e}[3,3] = 0.1524 s2{e}[17,17] = 0.1669
S2{e}[4,4] = 0.1576 S2{e}[18,18] = 0.1593
S2{e}[5,5] = 0.1641 S2{e}[19,19] = 0.1566
s2{e}[6,6] = 0.1691 S2{e}[20,20] = 0.1654
s2{e}[7,7] = 0.1726 S2{e}[21,21] = 0.1567
s2{e}[8,8] = 0.1734 s2{e}[22,22] = 0.1584
s2{e}[9,9] = 0.1719 s2{e}[23,23] = 0.1578
S2{e}[10,10] = 0.1644 S2{e}[24,24] = 0.1547
S2{e}[11,11] = 0.1458 S2{e}[25,25] = 0.1494
S2{e}[12,12] = 0.1498 s2{e}[26,26] = 0.1482
s2{e}[13,13] = 0.1585 S2{e}[27,27] = 0.1449
S2{e}[14,14] = 0.1564 s2{e}[28,28] = 0.1404
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Considering round-off error, these diagonal terms are not different, hence 
I conclude that the model is homoskedastic, and does not violate this aspect of 
Assumption 3: that is, the problem of heteroskedasticity associated with this 
assumption is not present in the model.
Each off-diagonal element of the variance covariance matrix gives the 
covariance between the disturbances associated with two of the sample 
observations. If all these off-diagonal terms are zero, the disturbances are said 
to be uncorrelated. This means that in repeated samples there is no tendency 
for the disturbance associated with one observation to be related to the 
disturbance associated with any other. If the off-diagonal terms are not all zero, 
the disturbances are said to be autocorrelated: the disturbance term for one 
observation is correlated with the disturbance term for another observation.
The off-diagonal terms of the variance-covariance matrix associated with 
this model (Table C-10 on page 84), considering round-off errors, are all zero 
for all practical purposes. However, since we want to be sure, I will conduct a 
second test for finding autocorrelated errors, a modification of the Durbin- 
Watson test statistic.
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The Durbin-Watson statistic is biased toward not finding autocorrelated 
errors, when a lagged dependent variable is a regressor. Thus, to evaluate 
autoregression, the Durbin h statistic is sometimes used. However, when the 
sample size multiplied times the variance of the lagged variable is greater than 
one, which is the case here, Durbin suggests an asymptotically equivalent test, 
namely, regress the OLS residual et on eM and all the explanatory variables 
and test against zero, in the usual way, the coefficient of et_.,. Hence ,we have:
H0: Pi = 0.
H i: Pi ^  0 .
. . . «  SSE(et.,) -  SSE(F) SSE(F)
where the test statistic is F =----- ;t -J — — —  + zj-f  '
d f  r  -  o f  F d f  F
level of significance: a= .05 n = 28, p = 7.
F* < F(0.95; 6 , 21) = 3.87, do not reject H0.
F* > F(0.95; 6 , 2 1 ) = 3.87, reject H0.
F* = 0.0663 <3.87
Thus we do not reject H0 .
As a result of our test, we conclude that there is no serious 
autoregression problems in our model, and that we have not violated 
Assumption 3.
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TABLE C-10: S {e} Matrix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1: [ . 1 3 , - . 0 4 , - 1
00o . 0 3 , - . 0 2 , -
CMO - . 0 1 , - 1V
oo 1oo 1oo 1*.
oo oo oo oo
2:
*3*O1 . 1 4 , - . 0 3 , - . 0 3 , - . 0 2 , - 01, - . 0 1 , - o 0 1 1*.oo 1s.oo oo o o V.oo oo
3: [ - . 0 3 , -
00o . 1 5 , - . 0 2 , - . 0 2 , - 01, - . 0 1 , - 1
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o 0 1 1
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oo
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oo 1oo 00
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TABLE C-10: S2{e} Matrix (continued).
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1: .00 i o o .00 .00 .01, .00 i
ooi oo - . 0 0
oo1 oo oo oo .01]
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(4) The fourth assumption, that the observations on the independent 
variable can be considered fixed with repeated samples, is not relevant in this 
case.
(5) The fifth assumption is that the number of observations is greater 
than the number of independent variables and that there are no linear 
relationships between the independent variables. The problem of 
multicollinearity is associated with this assumption.
The first step that I will take to evaluate multicollinearity is to examine the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). We have (VIF)-, = 51.43, (VIF) 2 = 5.85, (VIF)3 = 
42.56, (VIF) 4 = 13.81, (VIF)5 = 1.32, and (VIF) = 22.99, all of which indicate that 
some multicollinearity problems exist, which may effect the estimators in the 
model. This is confirmed by examining the pairwise correlations in Table 
below. However, only the multicollinearity between GNP and Number of 
Customers appears to be serious. Using the econometric rule of thumb, I will 
not worry about multicollinearity, since the R2 from the regression exceeds the 
R2 of any independent variable regressed on the other independent variables.
TABLE C-11: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation.
# of Avg. Price/ Lag of
Customers KWH GNP Cqdsuedp. Dummy
#  of Customers 1.000
Avg. Price/KWH -0.223 1.000
GNP 0.881 -0.338 1.000
Lag of Consump. 0.742 -0.640 0.803 1.000
Dummy 0.480 -0.078 0.377 0.254 1.000
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To be more specific, the OLS estimator in the presence of 
multicollinearity remains unbiased and in fact is still BLUE. The R2 statistic is 
unaffected. In fact, since all the CLR assumptions are (strictly speaking) still 
met, the OLS estimator retains all its desirable properties. The major 
undesirable consequence of multicollinearity is that the variances of the OLS 
estimates of the parameters of the collinear variables are quite large (58).
The OLS procedure uses only variation unique to the first regressor in 
calculating the OLS estimate of the coefficient of the first regressor; it uses only 
the variation unique to the second regressor in calculating the coefficient of the 
second regressor, and so on. For the purpose of calculating coefficient 
estimates, the common variation is ignored. When the regressors are highly 
correlated, most of their variation is common to both variables, leaving little 
variation unique to each variable. This means that the OLS procedure has little 
information to use in making its coefficient estimates, just as though it had a very 
small sample size, or a sample in which the independent variable did not vary 
much.
One of two common approaches researchers use in the face of 
multicollinearity, is to do nothing. The do-nothing approach is supported by 
Conlisk, who shows that multicollinearity can be advantageous in several 
circumstances (59). The existence of multicollinearity in a data set does not 
necessarily mean that the coefficient estimates in which the researcher is 
interested have unacceptably high variances. The classic example of this is 
estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function: the inputs capital and
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labor are highly collinear, but none the less good estimates are obtained. This 
has lead to the rule of thumb used above.
We have a similar case in the model with GNP and number of residential 
customers. In other econometric models of energy consumption the same 
phenomenon holds true. Yet, the models still produce good estimates. 
Therefore, I will accept the do-nothing approach to the problem of 
multicollinearity in this case.
To summarize, I have concluded that we have not seriously violated any 
of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model, and therefore the 
data presented in the body of this paper is not biased, and the estimates in our 
model are acceptable.
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TABLE C-12: Summary Statistics.




Standard Deviation = 11.198











Standard Deviation = 2.0119











Standard Deviation = 10.622











Standard Deviation = 1294.7











Standard Deviation = 216.50







Summary statistics for Dummy
NumNumeric = 28 
Mean = 0.28571 
Median = 0
Standard Deviation = 0.46004 
Interquartile range = 1 
Range = 1
Variance = 0.21164 
Minimum = 0 
Maximum = 1 
Skewness = 0.94868 
Kurtosis = -1.1000
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C.2.2. Derivation of Long-run Elasticities.
The long-run elasticity of price per KWH is obtained by (60):
~ . |n $ (price)
Long-run Elasticity of Pnce = 1 _ |n ( ,agged Y)
Here our long-run elasticity for price per KWH is 0.82, that is, in the long-run, for 
every increase in standard deviation of price per KWH, there will be a 0.82% 
decrease in consumption.
The formula can be used to obtain an interval estimate using the 
confidence intervals of the corresponding independent variables.
90% interval estimate:
0 555
Long-run Elasticity of Price (LB) = 2 5 2  = 0 742
0 149
Long-run Elasticity of Price (UB) = i~ _ 'q  3 9 9  = 1 -475 
Thus our long-run elasticity interval estimate is:
( 0.742 < Long-run Elasticity of Price < 1.475).
